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Abstract—A firewall’s proper functioning is critical 
to the network it protects. Thus, a firewall should 
be tested with respect to its intended security policy. 
We propose a feedback control based approach for 
test case generation to detect mismatches between 
firewall’s expected and executed behavior. In the 
proposed approach, abstract test cases are 
generated from firewall decision diagrams and 
instantiated with the test input values chosen using 
the proposed feedback control based selection 
algorithm. A case study is presented to validate the 
presented approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Firewalls have to be tested to validate that they 
work as specified. Literature on security [1], [2] mainly 
focuses on testing of firewall rules where firewall 
implementation is assumed error-free. However, a 
firewall can be hacked and programmed to behave 
differently from its specification or may have 
vulnerabilities as shown by Kamara et al. [3]. A 
firewall vulnerability is defined as an error made 
during firewall design, implementation, or 
configuration, that can be exploited to attack the 
trusted network that the firewall is supposed to protect 
[3]. One of the important goals of security management 
is identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities. 
The main focus of our firewall testing approach is 
the intended security policy. The intended security 
policy consists of firewall rules configuring the 
firewall behavior. The security policy is external to the 
firewall like a configuration file [4]. 
This paper uses firewall decision diagram (FDD) to 
represent firewall policy and proposes to generate 
abstract test cases through path coverage using 
decision paths on the FDD.  Instantiation of abstract 
test cases with test values selected based on the priority 
and weights using a feedback control approach is the 
novelty of the present paper. The test values with high 
priorities are assumed to have high probability to 
reveal mismatches between firewall’s expected and 
executed behavior. Weights are used to alternate 
among high priority test values. Once the concrete test 
cases are ready, firewall testing process is executed 
using firewall evaluator architecture [5].  
Next section summarizes related work before 
Section 3 outlines the background required for the 
proposed approach. The core of the paper, Section 4, 
explains our feedback control based test case 
instantiation approach for firewall testing. Section 5 
presents the case study we carried out to exemplify the 
approach. Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines 
future work planned. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The firewall implementation testing approach 
evaluates the firewall policy correspondence with the 
actions the firewall performs, e.g., it checks whether a 
rule indicates to block a packet, where the firewall 
illegally forwards the packet, and this being the result 
of a firewall implementation error [2]. This paper 
focuses on firewall implementation testing by taking 
into account only policy execution. 
There is one approach to firewall implementation 
testing by Senn et al. [6], who have worked on firewall 
implementation testing using protocol finite state 
automata (FSA) to generate abstract test cases through 
unique input/output (UIO) sequences [7] and 
instantiate abstract test cases with test tuples consisting 
of  
<protocol>, <srcIP>, <dstIP>, <action> 
fields of a firewall policy rule. However, in this work 
abstract test cases are generated from FDD and 
concrete test cases are built using  
<protocol>, <srcIP>, <srcPort>, <dstIP>, <dstPort>, <action> 
fields of a firewall rule. 
An approach to specification-based test generation 
for security-critical systems is proposed by Wimmel 
and Jürjens [8]. Although not directly related, in their 
work, the test sequences are determined with respect to 
the security properties required by the system, using 
mutations of the system specification and attack 
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scenarios. They also followed the abstract test case 
generation approach and their concretization to apply 
to an existing implementation. 
In this work, we use FDD [9] notion for modeling, 
whereas in our previous work [10], we used directed 
acyclic graph concept to deal with rule dependencies, 
which is implicitly handled by FDD. The present paper 
chooses FDD notation since formal, graph-theoretical 
notions and algorithms are utilized intensively with it. 
III. BACKGROUND 
While testing firewalls with respect to intended 
security policy, a model of the firewall policy helps to 
predict and control its behavior, for which FDDs are 
chosen. 
A.  Firewall Decision Diagrams 
A field Fi is a variable whose value is taken from a 
predefined interval of nonnegative integers, called the 
domain of Fi and denoted by D(Fi). A firewall decision 
diagram f (or FDD f, for short) over the fields F0, · · · , 
Fn−1 is an acyclic and directed graph that satisfies the 
following five conditions: 
“1. f has exactly one node that has no incoming 
edges, called the root of f, and has two or more nodes 
that have no outgoing edges, called the terminal nodes 
of f. 
2. Each nonterminal node v in f is labeled with a 
field, denoted by F(v), taken from the set of fields F0, · 
· · , Fn−1. Each terminal node v in f is labeled with a 
decision that is either accept (or “a” for short) or 
discard (or “d” for short). 
3. A directed path from the root to a terminal node 
in f is called a decision path. No two nodes on a 
decision path in f have the same label. 
4. Each edge e, that is outgoing of a node v in f, is 
labeled with an integer set I(e), where I(e) is a subset 
of the domain of field F(v). 
5. Let v be any terminal node in f. The set E(v) of all 
outgoing edges of node v satisfies the following two 
conditions: 
(a) Consistency: For any distinct ei and ej in E(v), 
I(ei) ∩ I(ej) = ∅ 
(b) Completeness: ∪e∈E(v) I(e) = D(F(v)) 
where ∅ is the empty set and D(F(v)) is the domain 
of the field F(v)” [9]. 
An FDD f over the fields F0, · · · , Fn−1 can be 
represented by a sequence of rules, each of which is of 
the form 
F0 ∈ S0 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn−1 ∈ Sn−1 → <decision> 
such that the following two conditions hold [9]. First, 
each rule in the sequence represents a distinct decision 
path in f. Second, each decision path in f is represented 
by a distinct rule in the sequence. Note that the order of 
the rules in the sequence is immaterial. The algorithm 
to generate a FDD is presented in [9]. 
 
B.  Test Case Generation for Firewalls 
Our test case generation consists of two parts. First, 
we generate abstract test cases. Abstract test cases are 
produced to test the correct policy handling of a 
firewall. Second, test input values are collected from 
various sources such as; firewall policy, domain 
topology knowledge, and black-lists. To obtain the 
concrete test cases, we instantiate abstract test cases 
with test input values. 
The sequence of firewall rules is converted to a 
FDD as described in [9], which is then used for test 
generation. Each decision path in the FDD represents 
an abstract test case. We select to abstract a firewall 
rule as  
IF  (<protocol>, <srcIP>, <srcPort>, <dstIP>, <dstPort>)  
THEN  <action>,  
where protocol is a network protocol, such as TCP 
or UDP, and action is either ACCEPT or DENY. The 
root node of a FDD represents the protocol field, and 
the terminal nodes represent the action field, 
intermediate nodes represent other fields respectively. 
Every decision path starting at the root and ending at a 
terminal node represents a rule in the policy.  
Sets of test input values may be constructed using 
equivalence class partitioning, intelligent segmentation 
[11] or expert knowledge. The equivalence class 
partitioning divides the input domain of policy field 
into a finite number of partitions or equivalence classes 
[12]. El-Atawy et al. [11] proposed intelligent 
segmentation, where potential erroneous regions in the 
the firewall input space are adapted using the firewall 
policy. When determining test input data, values that a 
hacker might choose may be considered in addition to 
using the blacklists from network/security 
administrator or third parties as well as using statistical 
significant/insignificant past traffic. In this paper, we 
choose the expert knowledge approach to construct test 
input values. Although more time consuming and 
costly, test input values selected using expert 
knowledge is assumed to reveal more errors than other 
two approaches. Moreover, expert knowledge can 
prioritize test input values, which is the default feature 
of our approach. Finally, we instantiate the abstract test 
cases with the test input data to obtain concrete test 
cases. 
C.  Test Evaluation Process for Firewalls 
Although firewalls are software implementations, 
the method of input and output used is network I/O. 
Thus, network packets should be produced, injected, 
and collected for testing a firewall. Test packets are 
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derived from generated test cases and those packets are 
sent or injected to the firewall to analyze its behavior. 
In order to analyze and evaluate the behavior of 
firewall under test (FUT) with respect to test cases, a 
special architecture as illustrated in Fig. 1 was 
developed in our previous work [5]. 
 
Figure 1. Firewall evaluator architecture [5]. 
The packet injection point (PIP) is used to release 
test packets. All the traffic entering and leaving the 
firewall is recorded and collected data is analyzed to 
obtain test outputs. The outputs are then compared 
with expected outputs to determine test result. The 
accepted packets are expected to be at the packet 
leaving point, but not the denied packets. The 
presented architecture can also be used to monitor a 
firewall constantly in order to check whether it 
operates in accordance with its specification and 
implementation [5]. 
IV. APPROACH 
The proposed firewall testing process is presented 
in Fig. 2. The process starts with the generation of 
FDD from firewall policy and continues with the 
generation of abstract test cases as explained in Section 
III. In parallel, sets of test input values should be 
prepared to instantiate abstract test cases. We choose 
expert knowledge method to construct those sets. 
Although the number of sets may vary from expert to 
expert, we decide to utilize three sets for each of the 
following fields:  src_IP, dst_IP, and dst_port. The 
selected sets are given in Table 1. Once the concrete 
test cases are generated, they will be converted to 
network packets and injected to firewall and the 
evaluation will be performed using firewall evaluator 
architecture as explained in Section III. 
For the instantiation of abstract test cases, we 
propose feedback control based approach to select test 
input values. The field values that have higher potential 
to reveal errors should be selected more often than 
others. In order to facilitate this idea, priorities should 
be stored along with field values in the sets of test 
input values and used in the selection process. 
Moreover, the sets should have dynamic weights so 
that alternating among sets is possible. The proposed 
approach is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of Proposed Firewall Testing Process. 
The controller is responsible for the determination 
of next weight vector (wv), which is composed of n 
weight values, where n is the total number sets of test 
input values. A weight value is a real number and it is 
initially equal to 1. The controller, remembering the 
current weight vector and using the feedback, namely 
the identity (ID) of selected set, determines the next 
weight vector using Equations (1) and (2).  
wvi(k+1) = wvi(k) - wap if i is the ID of selected set   (1) 
wvj(k+1) = wvj(k) + (wap/n-1) for all j not equal to i  (2) 
where wvi(k+1) is the the ith element of the weight 
vector at step k+1 and weight alternate percentage 
(wap) is a real number in (0,1).  
When there is a test value request, the selector 
chooses a test input value from the sets using the 
(setID,elementID) information that comes from the 
intensity calculator. The intensity calculator stores a 
priority vector (pv), which is composed of priorities of 
all elements of all sets.  
pv = (p11, p12,…,p1i,p21, p22,…,p2j,…,pn1, pn2,…, pnk)  (3) 
 
TABLE I. Sets of Test Input Values 
Field Set1 Set2 Set3 
Src_IP blacklist_admin blacklist_3rdp
arty 
past_traffic_ 
addresses 
Dst_IP current_domain
_addresses 
past_domain_
addresses 
past_traffic_ 
addresses 
Dst_port listening_ports vulnerable_ 
ports 
past_traffic_ 
ports 
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Figure 3. Feedback Control based Selection of Test Input Values 
 
The size of the priority vector is the total number of 
elements of all sets. For instance, assuming that each 
set given in Table 1 has three elements, the size of the 
priority vector is nine. The intensity vector (iv) is 
obtained by normalizing the priorities, which is 
achieved by dividing each priority to the sum of all 
priorities (Σp).  
iv = (i11, i12,…,i1i,i21, i22,…,i2j,…,in1, in2,…, ink)           (4) 
where ijk = pjk / Σp. 
The weighted intensity vector (wiv) is calculated by 
the scalar multiplication of the intensity vector with 
expanded weight vector (ewv), where expanded weight 
vector is composed of element weights that have their 
set weights. 
wiv = iv • ewv                                                             (5) 
The selected test value is the one where weighted 
intensity is the maximum of all weighted intensities. 
The intensity calculator passes the (setID, elementID) 
information of the maximum weighted intensity to the 
selector, which returns the corresponding test input 
value to the requestor. 
For illustration purposes, an example is given in 
Table II. In this example, there are 3 sets of test input 
values, each having 2 elements and their priorities are 
presented in the priority vector. Using (4) and (5), 
weighted intensity of each element is calculated and 
presented in the weighted intensity vector. The element 
that has the highest weighted intensity is selected as the 
test value input for that step. At the next step, the 
weight of its set is reduced by the controller using wap. 
In addition to that, the priority of the selected element 
is decremented by the intensity calculator using 
deprioritization constant (dc), which is used to lower 
the priority of an element so that other elements will 
have a chance to be selected. The algorithm for 
feedback control based selection of test input values is 
given below in Algorithm 1. 
The feedback control based selection should be 
performed separately for each field in the abstract test 
case. We suggest that test input values for the Protocol, 
Src_IP, Dest_IP, Dest_port fields should be selected 
for firewall testing. In the following section, we 
present a case study to illustrate the application of our 
proposed approach for feedback control based 
selection of test input values to firewall testing. 
V. CASE STUDY 
The policy of the firewall is considered as a 
specification. Therefore, the firewall testing context in 
this paper is specification based testing, where the 
operation of FUT, or implementation of its policy, is 
checked with respect to its specified policy, or 
expected behavior. Once the firewall policy is 
determined, it is loaded to the firewall and firewall is 
started. It should be noted that the loaded firewall 
policy on the FUT can be changed externally after 
starting the firewall. In that case, firewalls require re-
start. When that happens, we assume that the specified 
policy does not match the implemented policy and if 
there is a mismatch it should be identified.  
 
 
TABLE II. Test Input Value Selection Example using Feedback Control based Selection 
Weight Vector Priority Vector Weighted Intensity Vector Selected 
Set Step w1 w2 w3 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 wiA1 wiA2 wiB1 wiB2 wiC1 wiC2 MAX 
1 1,00 1,00 1,00 5 5 8 4 5 2 0,14 0,14 0,22 0,08 0,14 0,05 0,22 2 
2 1,05 0,90 1,05 5 5 7 4 5 2 0,15 0,15 0,18 0,08 0,15 0,06 0,18 2 
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 Algorithm 1. Feedback Control based Selection of Test Input Values 
INPUT : cut, wap, dc, ev, pv 
OUTPUT : osse 
cut: number of test input values required 
wap : weight alternate percentage 
dc : deprioritization constant 
ev : element vector 
pv : priority vector 
osse: ordered set of selected elements 
  1   proceed ← TRUE 
  2   WHILE proceed DO 
  3 Calculate wv using wap 
  4 ewv ← extend(wv) 
  5 Calculate iv using dc 
  6 wiv ← iv • ewv 
  7 selected_set ← selectS(ev, MAX(wiv)) 
  8 selected_element ← selectE(ev, MAX(wiv)) 
  9 osse ← osse ∪ selected_element 
10 cut ← cut – 1 
11 if (cut == 0 OR pv is all zero) then proceed ← FALSE 
12   DO WHILE 
13   return osse 
 
Firewall testing is one of the approaches to identify 
such a mismatch. Even if there is no mismatch between 
specified and loaded policies, the firewall software 
and/or hardware may not behave as expected. The 
unexpected behavior can also be uncovered by using 
the firewall testing approach stated in this paper, which 
has another merit of the proposition. 
The specified firewall policy in the case study is 
given in Table III. Then the policy is converted to a 
FDD, which is presented in Fig. 4. Using FDD, 
abstract test cases can be generated by traversing all 
paths so that path coverage criteria is achieved. For the 
right outmost path of FDD given in Fig. 4, the abstract 
test case is as follows: 
 
Test Input Protocol tcp 
Test Input Src_IP Src_1 ∪ Src_3 
Test Input Dest_IP www 
Test Input Dest_port ]80[ 
Expected Output Action deny 
 
To instantiate concrete test cases for this abstract 
test case, test input values should be selected for 
Src_IP and Dest_port fields. The sets given in Table I 
can be employed by our feedback control based 
selection approach. For the case study, the sets can be 
assumed to have elements given in Table IV with 
designated priorities. Similarly sets for Dst_port can be 
determined as given in Table V prior to test input value 
selection process. 
 
 
Figure 4. FDD of the Firewall Policy used for Case Study. 
Some of the test input values for Src_IP and 
Dst_port are selected using the proposed feedback 
control based selection algorithm with the wap=0.1 and 
dc=1, then values are concatenated to form <Src_IP, 
Dst_port> test input value pairs and presented below: 
 
<192.168.0.1, 143>; <127.0.0.1, 25>; <10.0.0.1, 143>;  
<88.241.34.41, 23>; <88.241.34.41, 25>; <192.168.0.1, 143>;  
<127.0.0.1, 23>; <88.241.34.41, 25>; <172.16.0.1, 143>;  
<10.0.0.1, 23>; … 
 
Using each <Src_IP, Dst_port> test input value pair 
to instantiate the abstract test case given in this section, 
we obtain a partial set of concrete test cases generated 
for the case study, which are presented in Table VI. 
For definitive fields, such as Protocol and Dst_IP, the 
values in the abstract test case are utilized. For 
Src_port field, which does not occur in the abstract 
case because it is not in FDD, a random number can be 
employed to generate related test value or any random 
number can be used as the test value. 
 
 
TABLE III. Firewall Policy used for Case Study 
Rule Protocol Src_IP Src_port Dest_IP Dest_port Action 
1 tcp 193.140.*.* any 140.130.120.80 80 deny 
2 tcp *.*.*.* any 140.130.120.80 80 accept 
3 tcp 193.140.*.* any 140.130.120.22 22 deny 
4 tcp *.*.*.* any 140.130.120.22 22 accept 
5 tcp *.*.*.* any *.*.*.* any deny 
6 udp *.*.*.* any *.*.*.* any deny 
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TABLE IV. Src_IP Sets of Test Input Values for Case Study 
Sets IP_Addresses Priority 
blacklist_admin 192.168.0.1 8 
blacklist_admin 172.16.0.1 6 
blacklist_3rdparty 127.0.0.1 7 
blacklist_3rdparty 10.0.0.1 7 
past_traffic_addresses 88.241.34.41 6 
past_traffic_addresses 215.15.568.23 5 
 
TABLE V. Dst_port Sets of Test Input Values for Case Study 
Sets IP_Addresses Priority 
listening_ports 25 6 
vulnerable_ports 143 7 
past_traffic_ports 23 5 
 
It should be noted that using same random value 
may cause some concrete test cases to be exactly same, 
e.g. see test cases numbered as 5 and 8. 
TABLE VI. Partial Set of Concrete Test Cases for Case Study 
No Test Input Expected 
Test 
Output 
1 tcp, 192.168.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 143 deny 
2 tcp, 127.0.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 25 deny 
3 tcp, 10.0.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 143 deny 
4 tcp, 88.241.34.41, 80, 140.130.120.80, 23 deny 
5 tcp, 88.241.34.41, 80, 140.130.120.80, 25 deny 
6 tcp, 192.168.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 143 deny 
7 tcp, 127.0.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 23 deny 
8 tcp, 88.241.34.41, 80, 140.130.120.80, 25 deny 
9 tcp, 172.16.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 143 deny 
10 tcp, 10.0.0.1, 80, 140.130.120.80, 23 deny 
 
After the composition of concrete test cases, 
network packets should be generated from concrete test 
cases and be injected to the network using firewall 
evaluator architecture explained in Section III. The test 
packets given above will reveal the fact that the 
firewall policy is compromised if the traffic coming 
from 88.241.*.* to 140.130.120.80:23 is allowed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We proposed a feedback control based approach for 
test case generation to test firewalls. In the proposed 
approach, abstract test cases are generated from a 
FDD, which is driven from the firewall policy, and 
generated abstract test cases are instantiated with the 
test input values chosen using the proposed feedback 
control based selection algorithm. 
The next step will extend the proposed approach to 
generate unique concrete test cases. The selection and 
prioritization of test input values in different sets will 
be automatized to obtain automatic firewall testing. 
Moreover, computational complexity and cost of the 
proposed approach will be investigated. 
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